



STUDY GUIDE

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NOTE FROM THE EXECUTIVE BOARD

A very warm welcome to all the delegates to this year's edition of PICT MUN. As all of you are part of the champion committee of the United Nations, that is the Security Council, expect nothing less than the top-notch quality of debate and deliberation.

It is imperative to know the nuances of technicalities for an agenda such as this. Efforts have hence been made to make this study guide robust, informative, and comprehensive. If you're a beginner, we hope that we succeeded in keeping this lucid for you. If you're passionate about MUNs, we hope that the cases and analyses written about serve as incentives for delving deeper. This guide, however, is not all-inclusive. It should be the beginning of your research—and not its end. It is suggested that you read in further detail about instances—the ones mentioned here, and the ones beyond.

We, as part of the Executive Board, would ensure that the delegates are provided with a welcoming and sophisticated environment to express their views and opinions. We would highly recommend you do your own research in conjunction to this study guide. The material in this guide is merely a starting point to get you going. Prior to the conference, feel free to contact us if you have any queries. We would love to help you out. We wish you good luck for your preparation and this conference itself, and hope that it impacts you in a positive manner. Thank you.

*The Executive Board
United Nations Security Council
PICT MUN 2020*

About the Committee

Among the six main organs of the United Nations established by the UN Charter, the Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and may meet whenever peace is threatened.

All members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council. While other organs of the United Nations make recommendations to member states, only the Security Council has the power to make decisions that member states are then obligated to implement under the Charter.

Acting under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, the Council shall when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means such as negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement (Article 33). And it may, if all the parties to a dispute request to make recommendations to the parties with a view to a peaceful settlement (article 38).

The Security Council may also take enforcement measures which are more robust than peacekeeping. These enforcement powers are contained in Chapter VII of the Charter, which authorizes the Council to determine when a threat to, or breach of, the peace has occurred, and authorizes it among other things to impose economic and military sanctions. Under Article 42 of the Charter, the Security Council has the power to order the use of force to maintain or restore peace and security.

However, the collective use of force as a military sanction does not operate in the way originally intended.

The Council's first action to a threat to peace is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means. The Council may:

- Set forth principles for such an agreement;
- Undertake investigation and mediation, in some cases;
- Dispatch a mission;
- Appoint special envoys; or
- Request the Secretary-General to use his good offices to achieve a pacific settlement of the dispute.

When a dispute leads to hostilities, the Council's primary concern is to bring them to an end as soon as possible. In that case, the Council may:

- Issue cease re directives that can help prevent an escalation of the conflict;
- Dispatch military observers or a peacekeeping force to help reduce tensions, separate opposing forces and establish a calm in which peaceful settlements may be sought.

Beyond this, the Council may opt for enforcement measures, including:

- Economic sanctions, arms embargoes, financial penalties and restrictions, and travel bans;
- Severance of diplomatic relations;
- Blockade;
- Collective military action.

A chief concern is to focus action on those responsible for the policies or practices condemned by the international community, while minimizing the impact of the measures taken on other parts of the population and economy.

Relevant Charter Articles

- Chapter V
- Chapter VI
- Chapter VII
- Chapter VIII
- Article 108
- Article 109



AGENDA: DISCUSSING REFORMATIONS TO THE UNSC, WITH EMPHASIS ON ITS MEMBERSHIP AND COMPOSITION

Need

Among its members, there are two main doubts about the suitability of the Security Council as a military decision-making body:

Firstly, that its structure – including both its composition and the existence of the veto power – is not suited to running fast-moving military operations; and that it lacks resources in certain spheres, including intelligence. Primarily some nations that vie for permanent membership, or veto, or both hold this view. In certain crises its members have different interests and views, making rapid agreement on action hard to secure.

Secondly, its judgments and possible bias have been very heavily criticized not only in the USA, but also by Group of 77 members in the UN General Assembly. There is a fear that a quick reaction capacity would mean, in practice, the North intervening in the South – and doing so on a selective basis reflecting particular interests.

Procedure

Reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) encompasses five key issues:

1. Categories of membership;
2. The question of the veto held by the five permanent members;
3. Regional representation;
4. The size of an enlarged Council and its working methods;
5. The Security Council-General Assembly relationship.

Of these, some are discussed in this study guide.

Amending the UN Charter is an onerous process, requiring not only approval of two-thirds of the UNGA, but also ratification of the relevant domestic legislation by two-thirds of UN member states (including all of the P5). The charter has been revised only three times in sixty-five years, including the 1963-1965 period when the UNSC expanded from eleven to fifteen by adding four elected members, which, till date was the last and the only time that the Council was enlarged.

Member States, regional groups, and other Member State interest groupings developed different positions and proposals on how to move forward on this contested issue. A reform to the Council requires an amendment to the UN Charter itself. As under Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter, any reform of the Security Council:

- would require the agreement of at least two-thirds of UN member states in a vote in the General Assembly;

- must be ratified by two thirds of Member States, with all of the permanent members of the UNSC (which have veto rights) agreeing to it.

Most importantly, all five permanent members must also ratify the amendment. This means that during the first stage, the veto specified in Article 27 of the Charter is not possible. However, the Parliaments of the five permanent members could prevent the entry into force of the Amended Charter by failing to ratify it post-approval.

Example

There has been only one instance of reform of the UNSC—and hence of amendment to the Charter—ever since its inception. Expansion of the Security Council took place 1965 by increasing non-permanent members from 6 to 10.

The increase was made in response to the expansion of the UN membership from 51 to 118 in 1963, when the General Assembly decided to expand the non-permanent seats. It was followed by the ratification of the UN Charter amendments in 1965.

The UNGA adopted Resolution 1991, Question of equitable representation on the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, which provided for the increase of non-permanent membership of UNSC from 6 to 10 states. The amendment came into force in August 1965. The Resolution stated that the non-permanent members of the UNSC should be elected following the pattern:

- Five from African and Asian States;
- One from Eastern European States;
- Two from Latin American States;
- Two from Western European and other States;

The five permanent UNSC members remaining unchanged. With the adoption of GA resolution in 1992, the question of equitable representation and increase in the membership of the UNSC has been discussed oftentimes. Momentum for a second round of reform can be traced back to 1993, when an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) was established with the objective of formulating solutions to the crisis of representation and hence explore proposals for UNSC reform. The first round of discussions under the OEWG was from 1994 to 2008, and continued thereafter under the Intergovernmental Negotiations 2009 onwards. Many countries, including the G4 and S5 blocs, gave their statements regarding the matter in the aforementioned years.

This Working Group, also dubbed the Never-ending Working Group, has presently entered its 26th consecutive year of deliberations.

REFORMS IN THE UNSC

BRIEF OVERVIEW

Period of political tensions between USA and USSR begins; resulting in numerous vetoes by both members

**IDEOLOGICAL
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
USA-USSR**

**1945, UNITED
NATIONS FORMED**

By the UN Charter, UNSC given the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security

1950, DEBATES ON KOREA

Resolution passes despite USSR's veto; GA RES 377(A) allows GA to take actions to fulfill UNSC's responsibilities if the latter fails to

1956, SUEZ CRISIS

France and UK veto proposals for cessation of Suez War

**1963, UNSC
EXPANDED FOR THE
FIRST TIME**

Expanded from 11 to 15 members; till date the only time the Council was expanded

1990

**1991, FALL OF THE SOVIET
UNION**

1996, UK'S STATEMENT

19 vetoes on all UNSC resolutions concerning the situation in Middle East

Says that the P5's importance as in accordance with the Charter must be upheld; views it as a responsibility and not a means of exploitation

1997, ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL

US vetoes all resolutions condemning Israel

2006

2009, FRANCE'S STATEMENT

Expresses favour in expansion of the UNSC, supporting increased African representation and permanent member status for G4 nations

CHINA

Remains silent regarding modifications to veto

2010, USA

Announces support for permanent UNSC seat for India

2011, ACTION AGAINST SYRIA

Russia casts its 10th veto on action against Syria since the war began in 2011

2018, IRAN NUCLEAR DEAL

Russia vetoes action against Iran; US threatens to proceed

The Right to Veto

The creators of the United Nations Charter conceived that five countries — China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) [which was succeeded in 1990 by the Russian Federation], the United Kingdom and the United States — because of their key roles in the establishment of the United Nations, would continue to play important roles in the maintenance of international peace and security. They were granted the special status of Permanent Member States at the Security Council, along with a special voting power known as the "right to veto". It was agreed by the drafters that if any one of the five permanent members cast a negative vote in the 15-member Security Council, the resolution or decision would not be approved.

All five permanent members have exercised the right of veto at one time or another. If a permanent member does not fully agree with a proposed resolution but does not wish to cast a veto, it may choose to abstain, thus allowing the resolution to be adopted if it obtains the required number of nine favourable votes.

History and Criticism

From the foundation of the League of Nations in 1920, each member of the League Council, whether permanent or non-permanent, had a veto on any non-procedural issue. The UN Charter provision for unanimity among the Permanent Members of the Security Council (the veto) was the result of extensive discussion, including at Dumbarton Oaks (August–October 1944) and Yalta (February 1945). The evidence is that the UK, US, USSR, and France all favoured the principle of unanimity, and that they were motivated in this not only by a belief in the desirability of the major powers acting together, but also by a concern to protect their own sovereign rights and national interest.


Particularly, the veto power for the five Permanent Members, proved highly controversial at the founding conference in San Francisco; the convening powers would not bend on these core elements of their vision. Agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta beforehand, the veto and permanent membership were designed to transform a wartime alliance into a big power oligarchy to secure the hard-won peace that would follow. The convening powers ordered concessions on numerous other points in the draft Charter in order to persuade other prospective member states to go along with this one-sided bargain, but would not budge at all on these core arrangements (or on keeping the bar high for efforts to amend them in the future).

Hence, the UNSC veto system was established in order to prohibit the UN from taking any future action directly against its principal founding members, since the failure of the League of Nations (1919–46) proved that an international organization cannot work if all the major powers are not members.


This de facto control over the UN Council by the 5+1 governments are seen by critics, since its creation in 1945, as the most undemocratic character of the UN. Critics also note the veto power as a main cause for most international inaction on war crimes and crimes against humanity. The veto does not apply

to procedural votes, which is significant in that those members having permanent membership in the Security Council can vote against a "procedural" draft resolution, without necessarily blocking its adoption by the Council.

Year Wise Use of Veto



Country Wise Use of Veto



Cold War (between 1947 and 1991)

The Security Council proved unable to respond effectively to the use of force by states during the Cold War; the veto (and the threat of the veto) by the five Permanent Members obstructed action by the Security Council. The use of force in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Afghanistan, and Vietnam could not even

be put on its agenda. The Security Council was not able to condemn illegal use of force; it was not able to implement Chapter VII in the way planned.

Debates on Korea (1950)

The most important part of resolution 377 A (V) is section A which states that where the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, the General Assembly shall consider the matter - immediately, including the use of armed force when necessary - to maintain or restore it.

The original Uniting for Peace resolution was passed by the General Assembly to break the deadlock caused by the Soviet veto in Security Council debates on Korea. On 3 November 1950, the General Assembly adopted resolution 377 A (V), which was given the title Uniting for Peace. It was a step for determination by the Security Council on measures to be taken in order to protect the Republic of Korea against the aggression launched against it by military forces from North Korea.

The resolution could be passed because the USSR, at that time, boycotted the meetings of the Security Council with the aim of obtaining the allocation of the permanent Chinese seat to the communist Government in Beijing. It assumed that in its absence, the Security Council would not be able to discharge its functions since Article 27; paragraph 3, of the Charter provides that substantive resolutions of the Security Council require an affirmative vote of nine members "including the concurring votes of the permanent members". The USSR vetoed two draft resolutions on 6 and 12 Sep. 1950 (UN docs. S/1653 and S/1752), which among other things, called on states to desist from supporting North Korea.

The majority of the members of the Security Council, however, were of the view that absence from the meeting room could not prevent the key organ of the United Nations from acting validly, a view that was later endorsed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

Given that its protests remained fruitless, the USSR sent again, as from August 1950, a delegation to the meetings of the Council, which cast a negative vote on a United States draft resolution, which condemned the continued defiance of the United Nations by the North Korean authorities. In order to overcome this impasse, the United States, under the leadership of its Foreign Secretary Dean Acheson, succeeded in persuading the General Assembly that it should claim for itself a subsidiary responsibility with regard to international peace and security, as enunciated by Article 14 of the Charter. The result of these efforts was resolution 377 A (V).

While the Uniting for Peace resolution has been highlighted as a possible instrument to authorize the use of force in the case of a veto as recently as 2001 in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report on the Responsibility to Protect, the increasing divisions between Assembly and Council, visible in particular during the debate about UN reform

in 2004–5, make it unlikely that the Council would currently be inclined to use the procedure.

Suez Crisis (1956)

When the first United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF), was established on 5 November 1956, to supervise the cessation of fighting in the Suez war between Egypt and troops from Israel, France, and the United Kingdom, it was not the Security Council, with its primary responsibility for international peace and security, that authorized the mission. Instead, this groundbreaking initiative for the UN had been requested by the General Assembly, to which the Council, paralysed by the French and British vetoes over the Suez crisis, had passed on the issue under the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure.

The 1950 Uniting for Peace resolution has been one of the most important attempts by the US and its allies to change the institutional balance of power between the Security Council and the General Assembly at a time when the Council was deadlocked because of regular Soviet vetoes, and the Assembly could command a safe pro-Western majority. While the Suez crisis has been the most prominent instance of 'Uniting for Peace', it has not been the only one.

Israel Settlements in East Jerusalem (1997)

From January 1990 until October 2006, there have only been nineteen vetoes, twelve of which have been connected to the situation in the Middle East, on which an emergency session called by the General Assembly has been in place since 1997. None of these vetoed resolutions mentioned threats to international peace and security; the vetoes, all by the US, were the result of language condemning Israel.

While these resolutions mostly addressed the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories, which certainly has implications for international peace and security, none of the resolutions explicitly referred to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, or to aggression, which are the instances under which the Uniting for Peace resolution calls on the General Assembly to meet for an emergency special session. Several of the resolutions call for an end of Israeli settlement activities and expropriation of land.

An emergency special session was called in 1997 on request of Qatar, then leader of the Arab Group in the UN, on the question of East Jerusalem and the occupied territories, following two US vetoes of resolutions condemning Israel's settlement policy in Jerusalem - on the resolutions S/1997/199 of 7 March 1997; and S/1997/241 of 21 March 1997.

Following two days of debate, during which the Government of Israel was criticized for its recent decision to build a new settlement in the Jabal Abu Ghneim area of East Jerusalem, the Security Council this evening failed to adopt a draft resolution that would have called upon Israel to refrain from such settlement activities. The vote in the Council was 14 in favour to one against (United States), with no abstentions, thus failing due to veto.

In response to the Council decision, the Permanent Observer for Palestine called for an emergency session of the General Assembly to take appropriate action. He said the United Nations would bear a permanent responsibility on the question of Palestine until that question was resolved in all its aspects.

Explaining its vote against the text, the US said it would not have helped the Middle East peace process. The draft resolution made sweeping statements concerning the legal status of Israeli settlements, which the parties themselves had agreed were to be treated as a permanent status issue in the talks they were about to resume.

Chemical Weapons Attack in Syria (2011 - 2017)

In November 2017, Russia on cast its 10th veto of United Nations Security Council action on Syria since the war began in 2011, blocking a US-drafted resolution to renew an international inquiry into who is to blame for chemical weapons attacks in Syria, saying that the resolution was not balanced. In order to be adopted, resolution needs nine votes in favour and no vetoes by the P5. The U.S. draft text received 11 votes in favour, while Russia and Bolivia voted against it, and China and Egypt abstained.

Syrian ally Russia withdrew its own rival draft resolution to renew the inquiry - known as the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) - after unsuccessfully pushing for its proposal to be considered second and not first, as council rules required. After the US-drafted resolution was voted upon, Bolivia then requested a vote on the Russian text. It failed, receiving only four votes in favour, seven against and four abstentions. Russia expressed its disappointment.

Russia had questioned the findings of JIM when it agreed to its formation in 2015. One of JIM's conclusions was that the Syrian government used chlorine as a weapon several times.

Violence against Palestinians (2018)

USA vetoed a UNSC draft resolution that condemned Israel's use of force against Palestinian civilians. A second, U.S.-drafted resolution that did blame Hamas for the violence and upheld Israel's right to defend itself failed to attract any other country's support when it was put to vote in the 15-member council. Blasting the council majority, the US remarked that two votes showed that the UN was biased against Israel hence willing to blame it, and unwilling to blame Hamas, the Islamist group that dominates Gaza.

Current Structure of the UNSC

The UN Charter, as amended in 1965, creates a fifteen-member council with the authority to impose binding decisions on all UN member states. The UNSC's power resides with the five permanent members designated in 1945 as the primary guardians of world order. The charter makes no mention of the specifics of the geographic representation as a consideration for permanent membership, but provides ten additional seats elected for two- year terms based on contributions to peace and security, with consideration to "equitable geographical distribution". In practice, the elected seats have been divvied up among the regional blocs.

Presently, the composition of the Council is as follows:

Total members: 15; of which:

Permanent members: 5, which are:


1. China;
2. France;
3. Russian Federation;
4. United Kingdom;
5. United States of America; and

Non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly: 10 (the year in the bracket specifies the respective end-of-term year.)

1. Bolivia (2018)
2. Côte d'Ivoire (2019)
3. Equatorial Guinea (2019)
4. Ethiopia (2018)
5. Kazakhstan (2018)
6. Kuwait (2019)
7. Netherlands (2018)
8. Peru (2019)
9. Poland (2019)
10. Sweden (2018)

As per General Assembly Resolution 1991 (1963), to ensure the representation of a politically diverse world, of these 10 non-permanent members:^[1]_{SEP}5 are selected from Asia and Africa, 1 from eastern Europe, 2 from Latin America, and 2 from Western Europe and other states that do not fall under the other regional designations.

From the perspective of the permanent members, the legitimacy of the UNSC as currently constituted is clear: it emanates from the UN Charter. As long as the charter remains in force and unamended, the existing UNSC structure is legitimate.



Geographical representation: During the negotiations, while addressing the issue of regional representation, countries tend to refer to the term geographical representation, following Article 23.1 of the Charter which endorses the criterion of equitable geographical distribution. Consequently, when additional member states are proposed in the models put forth by negotiators, countries are divided into blocks like “African States”, “Asian States”, “Group of Eastern European States”, “Latin American and Caribbean States”, or “Western European States”.

Any change in the membership of the Security Council requires a two-thirds vote from the General Assembly, which includes all the permanent members. The only change so far to the Security Council was in 1965. At that time, non-permanent membership was enlarged from six to its present ten.

A structural reform to the UNSC could be seen in two ways:

- Change in the number of members (expansion or contraction of the UNSC);
- Change in current status of membership (granting permanent membership to presently non-permanent members)

The G4 nations comprise of Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan, which support each other's bids for permanent seats to the UNSC. A reform in the structure could also examine an alternative model for the Council that would rather allot specific seats to regional organizations or blocs than to individual countries.

Views on Structural Reforms

A more compelling reason to support UNSC enlargement, is concern that an unchanged UNSC will become increasingly ineffective in addressing today's security challenges, which demand cohesive, broad-based multilateral responses.

Proponents of enlargement observe that the distribution of global power has changed dramatically since 1945, and that the number of UN member states has surged from 51 to 192 without a parallel expansion of the UNSC. The permanent membership of the UNSC, for example, excludes major UN funders like Japan and Germany, emerging powers like India and Brazil, and all of Africa and Latin America. Enlargement proponents warn that the UNSC's global authority will erode if it fails to expand membership from underrepresented regions. Moreover, skillfully accomplished enlargement could provide a near-term opportunity to manage power transitions, “socializing” today's regional leaders into “responsible” global actors that shoulder a greater share of international security.

A closer look suggests that while many arguments often offered in support of enlargement are awed, the case for expanding the UN Security Council is a compelling one. A common claim, particularly in the developing world, is that the UNSC is increasingly illegitimate and ineffective, given its:

- Inequitable geographic composition;
- Declining relevance to today's security threats;
- Inability to ensure compliance with its ostensibly binding resolutions; and

- Exclusion of countries that could contribute to international security.

According to this analysis, the UNSC is in poor and even terminal condition. Critiques of the UNSC's legitimacy have been couched primarily in terms of equitable geographical representation: According to regional blocs, the UNSC's domination by Western countries and failure to include permanent members from Africa and Latin America give it dwindling authority to issue binding international decisions, particularly in settings like sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of UN peace operations occur. The lack of perspectives from the global South reinforces perceptions that the UNSC is a neocolonial club, determining questions of war and peace for the poor without the input of their representatives. Skillfully accomplished, UNSC expansion could be an investment in global stability.

Proponents of regional representation, like Italy, see the EU as the first potential candidate representing the interests of large number of states, including Italy itself, Germany and Portugal. The African Union, Latin American region, and the OIC (Organization of Islamic Cooperation; an international organization consisting of 57 member states) also vehemently support this reform, as they have no such representations, but most of the main world contentions lie in their region.

Even if the arguments for expansions are to be considered, the hurdle to UNSC permanent membership must remain high, and aspirant countries should demonstrate an ability to broker and deliver global solutions to transnational threats.

Opponents of enlargement dispute that the UNSC is experiencing a crisis of legitimacy, arguing that it remains the most effective of all UN organs and that the UNSC's permanent structure still reflects the leading political and military powers. The four reasons (aforementioned) commonly given by the proposition for claiming the ineffectiveness of the Council are countered by the truth that, the situation is nowhere near so dire. The actual behavior of member states, as opposed to their rhetoric, suggests the UNSC's legitimacy, credibility, and effectiveness are more robust than critics claim.

Arguments about equitable geographical representation in the Council confront two inconvenient truths.

First, regional representation and parity were never the basis for designating the UNSC's permanent members, which were chosen primarily as guarantors of world peace. The same should be true, presumably, of any additional permanent seats. It could be said that the charter suggests that the candidatures of G4 - emerging powers such as Brazil or India (as well as established ones like Germany and Japan) - or other nations should be weighed not on their role as regional leaders, but on their ability to help safeguard international peace. The place to address regional balance is clearly in the UNSC's elected seats, since the Charter "equitable geographic distribution" as a secondary consideration.

Second, designating new permanent members will not likely satisfy demands for greater regional representation. Indeed, opposition to the main aspirants (Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan) is strongest from their regional rivals (Argentina, Mexico, Italy, Pakistan, and South Korea). Some propose that each regional bloc should determine its own permanent representative, but such decisions are more properly left to the entire world body. Regional selection could result in the seating of unexpected, possibly compromising candidates. Enlargement would:

- Dilute the power of members that are potential contributors to world peace;
- Increase gridlock;
- Encourage lowest-common-denominator actions, and;
- Empower antagonistic leaders of the nonaligned movement (NAM).

The expectation that obtaining a permanent UNSC membership will tame unruly behaviour of that state/bloc at the UN is naïve, and championing reform prior to confidence building among regional members could be disastrous. In any case, any UNSC reform is unlikely to be achieved.

Country Wise Reaction

At Dumbarton Oaks, the US, the UK, the Soviet Union, and China reached agreement on the general shape of the Security Council, and Yalta made possible a compromise on the voting issue that had proved intractable before. Precisely because negotiations over voting arrangements, especially over the extent of the veto, had been so long and difficult, none of the Great Powers was willing to accept changes later on, and they signaled this very clearly to the participants in the San Francisco Conference. Still, many smaller states made proposals to limit the veto, to limit the role of the Permanent Members in the Council, or to limit the powers of the Council as such – hardly any of them were successful.

Presently, common justifications for UNSC reform (based on equitable representation, regional entitlement, etc.) are perhaps unpersuasive, and much depend on the behavior of aspirant countries once on the UNSC. If change is desirable, the members have to effectuate it in this complex diplomatic landscape.

Greater Transparency in UNSC's Working Methods

The perception of the UNSC being an 'exclusive' committee having back-door closed talks is already being addressed by measures that would enhance the communication between the Council and the General Assembly, and there is no argument against maintaining, improving, and formalizing these measures. Some of these measures include:

- ✓ Regular meetings between the Security Council and the General Assembly,
- ✓ Briefings on the work of the Security Council,
- ✓ More open meetings of the Council, and
- ✓ Transparency of the work of sanctions committees.

These efforts shall be instrumental in improving the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The country and bloc-wise reactions to the said reforms are discussed in brief in this section.

P5

USA

The United States has provided various statements that state its support for UNSC Reform under the parameters that:

- The enlargement cannot diminish the Council's effectiveness or efficiency;
- Any proposal to expand permanent membership must name specific countries;
- Candidates for permanent membership must be judged on their ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security;
- Expansion proposals must accommodate Charter requirements for ratification, including approval from two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.

Former President Barack Obama had committed his administration to renovating outdated institutions and integrating emerging powers as pillars of a rule-based international order. Renovation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and its membership was a core component of that agenda. Obama's announcement in November 2010 of U.S. support for a permanent UNSC seat for India was a critical first step in this direction.

The United States—still the world's most influential nation—has a window of opportunity by advancing a clear vision of a renovated Security Council capable of implementing its mandate in an era of transnational threats.

China

During the bitter debate over the veto, China defended 'the rule of unanimity as essential for its [the Council's] strength and effectiveness. The alternative was a voting system, which, though it might be more perfect, might in a given moment weaken the Security Council in its efforts to act promptly and effectively'. Even Mao Tse-tung declared his support for the results of the Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta conferences and sent a representative of the Chinese Communist Party to San Francisco. In its Statement of 6 October 2009, however, China remained silent on the right of veto.

Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry spokesperson from 2010-2016, clarified China's stance about reforms in the Security Council. "China supports reasonable and necessary reforms for the U.N. Security Council to make it more representative for developing countries, especially for African countries," Hong said. "China advocates UN member states to seek "a package of" solutions and reach the broadest consensus with patient and democratic consultation", he added. Hong said China strongly opposes any "step- by-step" approach in the reform, and objects to forcing an immature draft resolution into action.

Russia

During the decisive debate over the veto, the Soviet Union cautioned that 'the Charter should not be looked upon as a code but as a summary of main principles governing the activities of the future organization.' Russian stance is in favour of granting permanent membership to the G4 (Japan, Germany, India, and Brazil) and to South Africa and Egypt. It is of the opinion that the veto power - neither expanded nor taken away - should remain in the hands of original P5 members.

Russia insists on minimalist expansion: the size of the enlarged Council should remain preferably at 20 countries. Russia agrees that there is a general necessity for reform, but like other P5 members, it is very concerned about the ability of an extended Security Council to deal effectively with peace and security and especially conflict resolution and crisis response matters. Russia has, in 2010, emphasized that none of the existing models of reforming the Council enjoy prevailing support in the UN; and has stated that it will support a reform that is likely to get support of a majority of the Security Council. It hasn't made proposals for any alternative models meanwhile.

United Kingdom

According to UK, the Charter mentioning P5 as permanent members makes clear that the purpose is not to confer upon certain states a privilege which they may abuse, but to ensure that the important decisions of the Council - which may involve the use of force or economic measures to uphold international peace and security - are taken with the commitment of the permanent members so that there is support and cooperation when such measures are taken. UK calls this to be the one provision which, perhaps together with the limited size of the Council, most distinguishes the Security Council from the other bodies of the United Nations, and contributes most directly to the authority of the Council and the achievement of decisions by the highest possible degree of consensus. In the view of the same, UK believes it is vital to retain this essence of the UNSC.

During the veto debate, a British delegate warned that any structure not resting on great power unanimity 'would be built on shifting sands, of no more value than the paper upon which it was written', and stated it to be a hard but inescapable fact. Justifying the UK's commitment to reforming the Security Council, it said that it was their conviction that reform must uphold the Council's ability to act effectively and decisively to address issues posing a threat to international peace and security. This is the Security Council's primary responsibility, as set out in the Charter, and reform must not diminish its ability to fulfil this role. The UK's own vision for reform remains that they support permanent membership for Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan along with permanent African representation. The UK also stated that they want to continue to work towards improving the Council's working methods.

France

According to France's statement in the General Assembly in 2010 regarding UNSC reforms, it is in favour of an expanded number of permanent and non-

permanent seats in the Security Council, such that its composition takes into account the emergence of new powers that possess the willingness and capacity to assume significant responsibilities. The reform must also take into account the emergence of new powers that want to assume the responsibility of a permanent seat. However, it stated in 2009 that the right of veto issue must not be allowed to block or serve as pretext to block the other necessary and urgent reforms of the Security Council.

France has reiterated in its General Assembly speeches its support for accession of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan to permanent member status, besides supporting an increased presence of African countries in particular within the Security Council, among its permanent members.

G4

India

Referring to the expansion of the UNSC in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, India has called it a “comprehensive reform” and the “real solution” for a more credible, legitimate, and representative Council. Many countries like Bangladesh, Belgium, Cuba, Czech Republic, Israel, Libya (under the Gadda Government), Nigeria, Qatar, Syria, Ukraine and UAE have supported India's bid. As a member of the G4, it has made a bid for permanent UNSC seat. It has been elected as a non-member seven times, one of which (2011-2012) with an almost unanimous vote of 188 out of 190 GA member states, India's bid has been supported by many states, including the P5, while only Pakistan has been in strong opposition.

India is the second largest country in terms of population, and the third in terms of active military. It is also one of the biggest contributors in the UN Peacekeeping Forces with over 8500 active troops at the time. The main problem concerning India's request for permanent membership is the fact that it has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which focuses on nuclear proliferation.

Japan

Japan considers that an increase in the permanent membership should be realized through the inclusion of both - countries that are developed, and those that are developing - and that the methodology for selecting new permanent members from among developing countries should be left to the respective regions to determine. Justifying its stance on the expansion, it believes that the addition of an appropriate number of non-permanent seats is necessary in order to make the Security Council truly representative of the international community as a whole. It also believes that equitable representation could be achieved and effectiveness in its work maintained by expanding its membership to 24, that is, 10 permanent and 14 non- permanent members.

Regarding the reform concerning the veto as a complex and highly sensitive issue that requires careful consideration, Japan suggested in its statement in 1998 that “a high-level working group” could be asked to consider the issue

and come up with^[1]_{SEP} recommendations. However, it does not imply that it is willing to side-line the reform to veto. Rather, it proposes the aforementioned approach so that an impasse on the veto question - which might prevent progress on the other aspects of reform - could be avoided.

Japan is the second largest contributor to the UN's budget by funding over 10%. Although, it is a G4 state, it is highly unlikely its request will be granted, at least for time being. Its bid has been backed by a few Asian states and all states of Oceania. However, it is China's strong opposition that plays a major role in not letting Japan have the desired membership.

Germany

Germany considers it a realistic approach to create new permanent members with the right of veto, who will in a legally binding manner commit not to exercise the veto until a review conference takes up the question of the veto. Such an approach could be combined with a political debate on how to best reduce the political relevance of the veto.

Germany said, in its statement in 1998, that the Council should strive for the broadest possible agreement for the reform. Everything should be done to facilitate reform, and not to prevent it from happening. In order for the Council to adapt to today's realities and a better representation of the regions, Germany supports the increase in the current small number of permanent members.

Being the third largest funder of UN (after USA and Japan), providing 7% of the UN budget, Germany is another nation bidding for the seat. Obviously, France, UK, and the whole EU closely support such a bid. While there is no state that has openly expressed its disagreement, since the European countries have two permanent and two non- permanent seats, Germany's request is less likely to be granted than those of India or Brazil, as their regions don't have a permanent seat.

Brazil

Brazil is the largest Latin American country in terms of populations, GDP and land area. It has the fifth largest population, seventh largest GDP, eleventh largest defence budget, and has the fifth largest land area. It is one of the only five countries that rank among^[1]_{SEP} the top ten globally in terms of physical size, population and GDP, the others being USA, Russia and China and India. It has also contributed to a number of UN Peacekeeping Operations such as: in Haiti, in East Timor and Lebanon. Generally, its bid has been supported by a large number of countries including Russia, Indonesia, the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC), France and the UK. There is no official resolution supporting Brazil. The only two states that have expressed their disagreement with Brazil's bid are the competitors from the Latin American and Caribbean Region: Mexico and Argentina.

Others

Australia

In the conflict over veto in the San Francisco Conference, only Australia's proposal to exclude the veto from all arrangements relating to the peaceful settlement of disputes was put to a vote, but it failed to attract enough support. Australia has made clear its position on reform(s) of the Security Council. Calling reform overdue, it stated that further delay and obstruction of the reform process would cost the Council's credibility and relevance, and that of the United Nations as a whole. Australia supports the expansion of the Council: by giving permanent seats to under-represented developing regions; by giving permanent seats to Japan and Germany, commensurate with their role in international peace and security; and by increasing the number of non-permanent seats, and a new understanding on the scope and application of the veto.

In addition to its stance, it advocates the proposal to review any new arrangements after ten years. It has stated that following the said reforms it would support greater openness and transparency in the Council's working methods.

Iran

Addressing the weakening of reform proposals by the differences within the Council and a lack of common position, Iran has stated that its current structure poses a "challenge" to global peace. At a meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement, Iran has urged reform of the Council, stating that the sanctions imposed by the it in dealing with issues that are "not necessarily a threat to global peace and security," are often inappropriate and have violated human rights. Iran has called for a major reform of the UNSC, aimed at improving its efficiency in dealing with international challenges.

Questions that a Resolution Must Answer

A good draft resolution must present clear details about the nature and manner of reforming the Security Council. It need not be limited to the questions mentioned here.

- What changes must the extant veto system have, if any?
- What criteria must be fulfilled for permanent membership to the UNSC?
- Why should or why shouldn't permanent membership entail the power of veto?
- How must a change be brought about in the present working methods of the Council?

This new environment of transnational threats, ranging from terrorism to nuclear proliferation to climate change, requires not only military but also diplomatic, economic, and technological capabilities. The relevant question is: What composition does the UNSC need to fulfill its mandate to maintain international peace and security?

For an effective and efficient solution to the agenda, a draft resolution must take into account the perspectives of the present members of the UNSC with their reasons, given the present provisions of the Charter.

May a good consensus be reached.

